Command and Control
October 19, 2026 — Eric Schlosser
Review
An excellent examination of nuclear command and control and the illusion of safety through the Titan II missile disaster in Damascus, Arkansas, in 1980. Over and over, safety concerns with nuclear weapons are raised to anyone who will listen: the Strategic Air Command, the Army, Navy, Air Force, the Joint Chiefs, Senators, Presidents. Over and over, none of them did anything. One of the central figures of the book, Bob Peurifoy, works for decades in a bureaucracy that is vain, sensitive, paranoid, and often nonsensical.
Why not put safeties on the nukes? Let’s ask the Army, page 197:
The Army didn’t like Peurifoy’s idea. A switch that operated as the W-49 warhead fell to earth, the Army contended, might somehow make the weapon less reliable. The Army also didn’t like what Sandia engineers called the switch: a “handling safety device” or a “goof-proofer.” Both terms implied that Army personnel were capable of making mistakes. Peurifoy thought that sort of thinking was sheer stupidity.
The Army rebuffed safeties because of what they were called, because to suggest that a bunch of 18-20 year olds in the field might make a mistake, might goof around, made them feel inferior. That’s not the only reason. Over and over, the military expresses a concern: safeties make nukes less likely to fulfill their intended purposes. If they’re too safe, they won’t kill people where we want them to kill people. They would rather the possibility of accidentally killing Americans than accidentally not killing enemies. What kind of military is that?
The folks that come off looking the worst are the senior military folks in command during the 60s-80s. They do not seem all that far off from the Generals in Kubrick’s War Room.
There are also all kinds of events described that simply make one shake their head. Who is trained to disarm bombs, to render them safe when something bad has happened? Page 418:
After months of training, Arnold passed all the tests at Indian Head and joined an EOD unit at Barksdale Air Force Base, outside Shreveport, Louisiana. He had learned how to defuse car bombs and biological weapons, to handle Broken Arrows and dismantle nuclear warheads. He was twenty years old.
Schlosser’s reporting is fantastic. There were times when I felt the historical tangents were not completely necessary, though I attribute that to my having read Rhodes’ The Making of the Atomic Bomb previously. Despite nearing 500 pages, the pacing is intentional, controlled, and impressive. I’d recommend it to anyone interested in US-based nuclear safety history and command and control structures.
Notes
- p46 - As Japanese cities vanished in flames, Léo Szilárd began to have doubts about the atomic bomb. He had been the first person to push hard for its development in the United States, but now he opposed its use against Japanese civilians.
- p92 - “I’ll tell you what war is about,” LeMay once said. “You’ve got to kill people and when you kill enough of them, they stop fighting.”
- p124 - [Albert Einstein] criticized the militarization of American society, the intimidation of anyone who opposed it, the demands for loyalty and secrecy, the “hysterical character” of the nuclear arms race, and the “disastrous illusion” that this new weapon would somehow make America safer.
- p194 - Iklé believed that, at the moment, the risk of accidental war was small. He thought the leadership of both the United States and the Soviet Union would carefully investigate the cause of a single detonation before launching an all-out-attack. And he felt confident that America could withstand the loss of a major city without much long-term social or economic upheaval. But an unauthorized detonation in the United States or Western Europe could have “unfortuante political consequences.” It could fuel support for disarmament and neutrality, increase opposition to American bases overseas, weaken the NATO alliance, and facilitate a “peaceful expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence.”
- p197 - The Army didn’t like Peurifoy’s idea. A switch that operated as the W-49 warhead fell to earth, the Army contended, might somehow make the weapon less reliable. The Army also didn’t like what Sandia engineers called the switch: a “handling safety device” or a “goof-proofer.” Both terms implied that Army personnel were capable of making mistakes. Peurifoy thought that sort of thinking was sheer stupidity.
- TB: What a bunch of fuckin’ babies.
- p220 -The first intercontinental missile developed by the United States, the Snark, had wings, a jet engine, and a range of about six thousand miles. It was a great-looking missile, sleek and futuristic, painted a fiery red. But the Snark soon became legendary for landing nowhere near its target. On long-distance flights, it missed by an average of twenty miles or more. During one test launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida, a Snark that was supposed to fly no farther than Puerto Rico just kept on going, despite repeated attempts by range safety officers to make it self-destruct. When the slow-moving missile passed Puerto Rico, fighter planes were scrambled to shoot it down, but they couldn’t find it. The Snark eventually ran out of fuel and crashed somewhere in the Amazonian rain forests of Brazil. Air Force tests later suggested that during wartime, only one out of three Snarks would leave the ground and only one out of ten would hit its target. Nonetheless, dozens of Snarks were put on alert at Presque Isle Air Force Base in Maine. The missile carried a 4-megaton warhead.
- p226 - A thick coating of plastic was added to the nose cone, and during reentry, layers of the plastic ablated—they charred, melted, vaporized, and absorbed some of the heat. The cloud of gases released by ablation became a buffer in front of the nose cone, a form of insulation, reducing its temperature even further.
- TB: Smart! How did they think of this?
- p234 - The portable vapor detector—a blue rectangular steel box that weighed about twelve pounds, with a round gauge on top—wasn’t an ideal instrument for the task. it “pegged out” and shut off when the vapor level reached a maximum of 250ppm. But it was the best they had.
- TB: Reminiscent of the Geiger counters at Chernobyl.
- p254 - The BMEWS site at Thule had mistakenly identified the moon, slowly rising over Norway, as dozens of long-range missiles launching from Siberia.
- p372 - The role of weapons laboratories had become mainly advisory. They competed for contracts from the Department of Defense—and felt reluctant to criticize their largest customer.
- p418 - After months of training, Arnold passed all the tests at Indian Head and joined an EOD unit at Barksdale Air Force Base, outside Shreveport, Louisiana. He had learned how to defuse car bombs and biological weapons, to handle Broken Arrows and dismantle nuclear warheads. He was twenty years old.
- p464 - The title of an influential essay on the role of technology in society asked the question: “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” According to its author, Langdon Winner, the answer is yes—the things that we produce are not only shaped by social forces, they also help to mold the political life of a society. Some technologies are flexible and can thrive equally well in democratic or totalitarian countries. But Winner pointed to one invention that could never be managed with a completely open, democratic spirit: the atomic bomb. “As long as it exists at all, its lethal properties demand that it be controlled by a centralized, rigidly hierarchical chain of command closed to all influences that might make its workings unpredictable,” Winner wrote. “The internal social system of the bomb must be authoritarian; there is no other way.”